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Bonaparte, the liberator
Luciano canfora
In the beginning of 1792, when the most dramatic changes of the Revolution had not yet been produced, and, however, the european powers considered the hypothesis of performing a military intervention in France in 
order to grant again to Louis XvI (who had been discredited before his people 
due to the escape from varennes) his full power, in Paris the “party of the war” 
was represented by the Girondists, particularly by Brissot and dumouriez. In 
april 20, with the so-called “Girondist cabinet”, the declaration of war was 
issued. as the emperor of austria had not responded to the French ultimatum, 
Maximilien Robespierre lined up, as of the first moment, against the choice of 
war. He was not, then, a member of the new parliament, the legislative assembly, 
but performed his battle in the club of the Jacobins, an important “pressure” 
group, but which was not yet a force of government. as of January the 2nd, 
Robespierre vigorously declared himself against the war, that is, especially against 
the Girondist pretense, or illusion, that “liberty” could be “exported”. “the most 
extravagant idea” said Robespierre, 
“that can be born in the mind of a political man is to believe that, for a people, 
it suffices to invade the territory of a foreign people at gunpoint to make them 
adopt their laws and their constitution. nobody loves the armed missionaries; the 
first advice that nature and prudence offer is to repel them as enemies.”
and further: “Wanting to grant freedom to other nations before having 
achieved it ourselves means to ensure, at the same time, our servitude and the 
servitude of the whole world.”
His speech shines due to its historical and political solidity. Robespierre 
(2000, t.vIII, p.81-2) reminds the Jacobins that the Revolution had been 
launched by the upper classes:
“the parliaments, the noblemen, the clergy, the wealthy people were the ones 
that drove the Revolution forward; the people appeared only afterwards. they 
changed their minds or wanted, at least, to stop the Revolution when they 
realized that the people could recover their sovereignty; but they were the ones 
that started it. Without their resistance and their mistaken calculations, the 
nation would still be under the domination of the despotism.”
and he continues:
“For that reason, in order to successfully ‘export’ liberty (that is, the Revolution) 
it would be required to count on the support from the upper classes in the 
notes on nation 
and nationalism 
fabio WanderLey reis
In an article in the present issue of estudos avançados (“the religion of politics in Israel”), david Bidussa recalls Zeev sternhell’s distinction between two “cultural templates” for the idea of nation: the “romantico-
political” notion inspired by Herder and based on the concept of “volk”, 
and the “Illuminist-Jacobin” view founded upon the principle of citizenship. 
the distinction can be likened to two problems that authors of political 
development literature, which flourished some decades ago, used to highlight 
as demanding solution in the implantation and expansion of the modern 
nation-state: the problem of identity, in which nationality emerges as a decisive 
condition of the personal identity of people and as an object of loyalty, and 
that of equality, which refers to citizenship and its enrichment and expansion 
– in the terms of t.H. Marshall (1965), the passage from civil rights (the legal 
warranties at the base of the “Rechtstaat”) and political rights (especially the 
right to vote and be voted for) to social rights (access to health, education, 
social security, etc.). However, to the existing problematic, this literature 
added the problem of authority, which involves appropriately building up 
the bureaucratic and symbolic apparatus of the state (see Rustow, 1967, for 
example).
these “problems” or dimensions are tightly interwoven. It is quite clear, 
as suggested by the very fusion indicated by the expression “nation-state”, 
that the socio-psychological elements of national identity make an important 
contribution to the symbolism of the state and its bureaucratic or instrumental 
ramifications, that is, its capacity to operate efficiently upon the collectivity as 
such. Yet the problem of equality immediately stands out given the exhortation 
to solidarity contained in the reference to the common sharing of the national 
condition. solidarity emerges as a virtue defining duties (at the limit, the 
sacrifice of one’s life itself) that society intends to be able to demand of the 
citizen, and a classical and “republican” view – the one contained in Benjamin 
Constant’s “freedom of the ancients”, or in the notion of citizenship as civism 
– turns these duties into the touchstone of the very definition of citizenship. 
However, even back in the city-states of classical antiquity, as in athens 
or republican Rome, there were already experiments in which the demand 
for civism and patriotic solidarity came together with an egalitarian and 
democratic drive. as pointed out by ellen Meiksins Wood (2003), the crucial 
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trait of those experiments, especially in athens, lies in the peasant-citizen, or 
in the fact that peasants may be citizens, in contrast with what normally occurs 
in traditional societies, where the appropriating state subjugates the peasantry. 
this is linked to the more general idea that producers (peasants, shoemakers, 
ironmongers, or manual laborers in general) can become rulers – being 
citizens, they can participate in the government of the community. 
But the republican and democratic experiment in the ancient city 
(which, in the case of athens, met with resistance from some of the major 
names in Greek philosophy) ended up proving problematic and fleeting.  and 
it is no doubt possible to identify the issue of equality, as do the “political 
development” writers, as the most specifically “modern” part of the trinomial 
“modern nation-state”. this unfolds into something of special significance: 
aside from justifiable disputes as to the existence or otherwise of an ancient 
(“acquisitive”, “wild”) capitalism, it was with the post-Renaissance affirmation 
of capitalism that the problem of equality and the “social question” gained 
decisive importance, lending the modern sociopolitical process a genuinely 
revolutionary edge. 
on one hand, from the perspective of citizenship, the conditions of 
an expanding capitalism and the emergence of the issue of equality as an 
effective problem tie in with the affirmation of the liberal ideology, in which 
the incipient egalitarian impulse of the classical republican experiments 
becomes intense and vocal. Hence the fact that the “civic” emphasis of the 
classical citizenship of antiquity is replaced by the emphasis on a “civil” 
concept of citizenship in which the citizen par excellence, rather than being 
just encumbered with duties and responsibilities before the collectivity and the 
state, is first and foremost the bearer of “rights”, whose enjoyment is secured 
by resources available to him in the private sphere and which he affirms not 
just before his peers, but also before the state as a potential source of  tyranny 
and oppression.
on the other hand, this liberal affirmation of rights and equality was 
bound to universalize and gain explicit social expression, as a consequence 
of which capitalism itself seemed to be put in check. that is the reason the 
relationship between capitalism and democracy came to appear inevitably tense 
and unstable. With the masses now armed with suffrage, it seemed inevitable 
to many that matters would progress toward either the expropriation of the 
capitalists and the onset of socialism or a conservative restoration and the 
suppression of democracy (offe, 1984). thus, the revolutionary feature of 
the modern sociopolitical process resulted in the challenge of engineering the 
“constitutional” accommodation of conflicts, or of building the institutional/
legal apparatus in which conflicts could be framed and processed in a routine 
manner capable of avoiding violent clashes. through varied vicissitudes, in 
which the social question often assumed such a violent guise (to say nothing 
of the long experiments with authoritarian socialism and fascism), in advanced 
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capitalist countries, where it could run more deeply, the process ended up in a 
combination of the “civil” and “civic” dimensions of citizenship.     
to use the terms of George a. Kelly (1979), one could speak both of a 
“civic II”, in which the psychological vigor of modern patriotism, identification 
with the nation and national solidarity represent a return to the “civic I” of 
classical citizenship, and of a “civil II”, in which access to the “clientelistic” 
benefits of the welfare state represent an expansion of the initial modern 
affirmation of liberal rights (or “civil I”). on the “civil” side, this is the logic 
of the expansion of citizenship presented by Marshall (1965), culminating in 
some form of social-democracy. on the “civic” side, the crucial idea is that 
effective institutional construction (and thus “constitutional” accommodation) 
cannot be achieved without the factor of convergence represented by some 
degree of identification with the wider collectivity, or without the sense of 
community that comes from participating in a larger whole – a requirement 
for the existence of the appropriate “political culture”, with the “consensus on 
fundamentals” it demands. 
now, if community in this sense must be created, the territorially-
based collectivity, made up of those bound by relations of vicinage or common 
occupation of a certain territory (if not of kinship), furnishes a natural focus, 
which concerns the “primordial sentiments” dealt with by Clifford Geertz 
(1973). the feat of the modern national state was to stretch the range of 
operation of the relevant mechanisms from the scale of the city-state to a 
much larger one, through a process of integration and centralization only seen 
hitherto in conquest-based imperial experiments typically lacking in precisely 
such community feelings.
this integration or unification involved, to begin with, a process 
of psychological mobilization, in which more effective channels of 
communication (often, in the classic cases of europe, favored by the catalyzing 
role played by the hegemony of a “nuclear area”[deutsch, 1967]) enabled 
disperse or “parochial” populations to be “assimilated” and see as natural 
the reference to what would come to be the nation as such. From this point 
of view, the process required incorporating and neutralizing the relevance 
of ethnico-cultural and linguistic differences – despite the resistance it met 
with in many cases and the ensuing “ethnic irredentisms”, giving rise to 
nationalisms of narrower bases. 
However, while this side of communication and assimilation may make 
it appear “natural” to think in terms of the national state (and render more 
difficult for one to escape even analytically, nowadays, the perspective thus 
defined), it combines rather troublesomely with the social question and the 
problem of equality. some revealing shades in the articulation between the two 
aspects can be observed in the work of two important Brazilian authors.
Let us begin with Helio Jaguaribe, an important name of the former 
Instituto superior de estudo Brasileiros (IseB). Jaguaribe’s is an explicit and 
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elaborate defense of a nationalist position, and its articulation with the social 
question is expressed in terms of a supposed confluence between what the 
author calls the “representativeness” and the “authenticity” of class ideologies. 
Class ideologies are representative according to the degree to which they suit 
the “situational” interests that engender them, that is, the class interests from 
which they presumably derive. their authenticity, on the other hand, concerns 
the measure in which, regardless of the class interests they express, ideologies 
formulate “for the community as a whole criteria and directives that [...] allow 
better advantage to be taken of the natural conditions of the community, 
in connection with the predominant values of the civilization to which it 
belongs”. assuming that the relationship of class ideologies to economic 
development is the main criterion of their authenticity, Jaguaribe sustains that 
we would have, in post-1930s Brazil, a fortunate convergence between the two 
attributes of the ideologies, so that struggling for development would be the 
best way for each class to pursue its own interests (Jaguaribe, 1958,  
pp. 48-50). 
It is easy to identify the illusory component in Jaguaribe’s approach, 
which leads him to underestimate the autonomous weight and dramatic nature 
of the problem of equality in Brazil. However, this is the approach one should 
expect from a nationalist intellectual. More revealing is to see nationalism 
creep in the back door, as it were, in the Marxist-leaning analyses of the so-
called “dependence theory”, to which Fernando Henrique Cardoso made an 
important contribution. despite the leftist criticism of nationalism that issues 
from Marxist internationalism, the denunciation of “dependence” that the 
theory involves inevitably results in assuming a nationalist position, and it was 
always read as nationalism, despite Cardoso’s protestations to the contrary. For 
the denunciation points, of course, to national autonomy as the desideratum 
to be contrasted with the condition of dependence, and supposes that nations, 
as the “natural” and prominent foci of reference for the collective identity 
of their members, ought to be autonomous subjects. Without postulating 
the value of the autonomous affirmation of specifically national collective 
identities, the theory would not be able to escape a dilemma in which the 
denunciation becomes senseless: either extend the prescription of autonomy to 
each and every collectivity of whatever scale (which, as a collectivity, will also 
have its identity:  shouldn’t we seek to liberate the Brazilian northeast from 
its “dependence” with regard to the southeast?), or else simply give up the 
denunciation (without identity there is no reason for autonomy, and no way 
of having autonomy) in favor of the factual recognition that collectivities, like 
individuals, always tend to relate to each other in terms involving hierarchies 
and asymmetries of power and resources. 
one could sustain that what we have with the theory of dependence, as 
a distorted consequence of the Marxist perspective that inspires it, is a curious 
inversion of what one would expect with regard to the relations between the 
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analytical and normative aspects of the reflection on nationalism.  on the 
analytical level, it would be necessary, of course, to devote due attention to the 
problems surrounding the nation as the focus for the definition of personal 
and collective identity and the multiple relevant sociopolitical ramifications 
that stem from that. on the doctrinarian or normative level, in turn, it has 
always been necessary to underscore the at least potential irrationalism behind 
all forms of nationalism and the fact that it was an important factor in some 
of the darkest events in modern history and in various forms of political 
authoritarianism: nazi-fascism, obviously, and even the “Big Brazil” ideology 
of our own recent dictatorship, in which the appeal toward convergence which 
Jaguaribe’s analysis sees as a spontaneous occurrence was exacerbated in a 
sinister and violent way. the difficulties are aggravated, furthermore, under 
globalization and the current world conditions. If the nationalism of the 
IseB, in its affirmation of national identity, sought to replace the naiveties 
of traditional patriotism (our forests are greener…) with an emphasis on the 
material and economic tasks of the promotion of national development, the 
conditions engendered by globalization, in which some of the very tendencies 
highlighted by dependence theory unfold, raise a difficult although not 
entirely new question: the necessity to disassociate the problems of personal 
and collective identity, which are, in principle, resolved on the cultural 
plane, from those concerning the more or less successful insertion of nations 
in the global economic dynamics, with the consequences for material life 
opportunities for their populations – in our case, for Brazilian society as a 
whole, especially the less privileged masses.            
dependence theory, however, does the opposite of what emerges from 
these recommendations. on one hand, embarrassed by the notion’s low stock 
in the Marxist tradition, it falls silent on the theme of the nation and on the 
analytical complications produced by its articulation with different aspects of 
the general problem. In so doing, just like the Brazilian nationalism of the 
1950s, it ties the authentic affirmation of nationality (and, at the extreme, 
the very sense of national dignity) to a certain equivocal ideal of economic 
autonomy of nations.1 at the same time, it exposes itself to a difficult question, 
which is in fact just a sharper rephrasing of that raised in the previous 
paragraph, and which could be put to it either from the perspective of the 
old “conservative” criticism of nationalism as hammered out by a Roberto 
Campos, for example, or even, perhaps, from a radical leftist perspective: seen 
from the angle of the vital opportunities that open (or close…) to the Brazilian 
poor, what difference does it really make if the surname of the capitalist willing 
to hire them is silva, Jones or schmidt?
However that may be, it is appropriate to explore the analytical 
roots and certain doctrinarian ramifications of the authoritarian dangers of 
nationalism. they certainly have a lot to do with the peculiar power of those 
“primordial sentiments” invoked above in reference to Clifford Geertz, which, 
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in turn, articulate with the “ascriptive” character – to use the old sociological 
jargon - of the condition of being a “national” of this or that country: we are 
dealing here with the immersion, from birth, in a territorially-based collectivity 
of “multifunctional” characteristics that envelope the individual in a complex 
manner, forcibly molding and conditioning him or her in a deep way. such 
characteristics help to produce the “suffocating” feature which ernest Gellner 
(1996) does not shy from pointing out even in the “virtuous” republican 
civism of the ancient city, which, with its unconditional demand for loyalty, 
was not accompanied by the idea of civil rights; rather, as Gellner emphasizes, 
it shared certain characteristics with the clearly negative model of the Islamic 
umma, with its pressure for conformism and submission to a common faith.   
If we assume the goal of collective autonomy tacitly affirmed by 
dependence theory, then the decisive question becomes how that collective 
autonomy is to relate with individual autonomy – and the obvious answer is 
that, if autonomy is a value, its affirmation on the collective level cannot result 
in its negation on the level of the individual. the nationalist disposition all 
too often forgets (or is willing to sacrifice) the latter in favor of the former. 
the most dramatic and telling illustration of the contradiction inherent to 
this is perhaps the 1836 “gag rule” passed by the united states Congress, 
which prohibited the discussion or acceptance of any petitions or proposals 
concerning the issue of slavery, leaving all decisions on the matter to the 
discretion of each state on the ground that in the view of the southern states it 
was something crucial to their identity and way of life (Holmes, 1993). From 
the point of view of autonomy as a value, the rule was patently absurd, as the 
autonomy of the southern states was upheld at the cost of continued slavery 
and so of the radical negation of the individual autonomy of many. 
two brief sets of reflections to finish these notes. Firstly, in accordance 
with the view of the relations between collective and individual autonomy 
outlined above, one should stress the culture of individualism and democratic 
pluralism into which autonomy as a value must necessarily translate. Rather 
than the psychological fusion and effusion that the nationalist or patriotic 
spirit expects and encourages and the authoritarian ethos that usually 
accompanies it, what is to be hoped for is that citizens become capable of 
“decentering” with regard to their collectivity, so that the latter can be 
an object of allegiance through a posture of sober and reflective civism 
distinguished by tolerance as the virtue par excellence and by the identification 
with varied groups and categories voluntarily adhered to, rather than 
“ascribed” or imposed (in contrast to a certain “multiculturalism” which tends 
to value the multiplying of identities based on “primordial” and absorbing 
ties, re-issuing on a “micro” scale all the difficulties of a “macro” nationalism). 
this posture will also involve the recognition that the autonomy in question, 
should it wish to serve as the platform for democracy and pluralism, cannot 
exclude the pragmatic component that sees as legitimate the individual pursuit 
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of interests, understood here as corresponding generically to personal goals of 
any nature and to the “self-affirmation” which writers like Habermas (1975) 
and Pizzorno (1966) take as the very definition of the idea of interest – with 
the proviso, of course, that their pursuit be ruled and mitigated by that sober 
and tolerant civism. this is the sense Gellner (1996), for instance, defends 
for the expression “civil society”, looking to recover a long line of pluralist 
thought against the inconsistent and normatively equivocal idealizations that 
have become so common in the recent abundance of literature on the theme. 
secondly, an important set of interconnected qualifications. We have 
already mentioned the globalized world and the difficulties it aggravated 
for a nationalist perspective “instrumentally” oriented by the promotion of 
economic development. It so happens that globalization and its correlate 
processes have a significant impact on the articulation of the problems of 
identity, authority and equality, creating a peculiar disjunction among them. 
so, if nationality continues to provide the key point of reference for personal 
identity (there is nothing on the transnational level capable of competing with 
the sense of participation in a community that nationhood brings about), the 
problems related to “authority” and “equality” emerge with deeply changed 
features. not only does the state’s role as the administrator of problems 
concerning the “systemic” and social integration of capitalism come to be 
questioned and hindered (not to mention the worldwide defeat of socialism 
and its disappearance as a relevant aspiration or goal), but so does the enriched 
form of citizenship that Marshall’s analysis saw as crowning a long process of 
development see itself threatened in favor of the roughness of the market.     
However, we still have the resilience of the welfare state, even in 
countries where it was more severely attacked, and the complex political and 
partisan game that is played out around it. Furthermore, with each economic/
financial crisis it becomes increasingly apparent that there is urgent need for 
a functional equivalent of the state capable of effective action on the global 
scale at which market mechanisms have come to operate. of course, there is 
little cause for optimism on this score: all signs point to a turbulent future 
fraught with tribulations and hard lessons. and the hardships seem particularly 
severe on the social plane, where the economic dynamics have combined with 
yawning inequality and ample restrictions – in a world in which capital moves 
swiftly – to the circulation of workers across the frontiers that separate the 
economically advanced countries from the rest.
one way or another, not only will any attempt at institutional 
construction on the transnational level have to count on the national states 
as important agents, but also, given the impossibility of some form of 
transnational Keynesianism or social democracy in the foreseeable future, we 
cannot relinquish the action of the state in economic and social administration 
on the national level – nor the solidarity that state action requires. this is even 
truer of a country like Brazil, affected by stark inequality. Let us disabuse 
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ourselves of the illusions and mystifications surrounding the idea of identity: 
the Brazilian national question is, with better reasons than in other cases, 
the social question, and we must recognize that a genuinely democratic and 
pluralist society will not be built without first creating the material conditions 
for overcoming the country’s inequality (even if that comes at the cost of the 
colorful identity associated with a folkloric image of Brazil that tends to be 
exploited in various ways). But, underpinning the action of the state, even if 
oriented by the critical spirit of a reflective civism, some form of nationalism 
will probably continue to be necessary. 
Note
1   In fact, the accusation of “nationalism” was leveled against dependence theory 
by Francisco Weffort (1971), in an old debate with Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1971). But Weffort, who would later become Minister of Culture under Cardoso’s 
Presidency, did not intend to demand more attention to the idea of nation and its 
cultural correlates. His aim was rather to demand orthodoxy, calling attention to the 
contamination of the analytical perspective by the introduction of the “spurious” 
concept of nation.  
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